Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2008.05.012zbMath1176.90265OpenAlexW2035231212MaRDI QIDQ1041991

Ioanna Katrantzi, Steven Alpern

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.05.012

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysearch theoryOR in biology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Search theory (90B40) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals ⋮ Partnership formation based on multiple traits ⋮ A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time ⋮ Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare ⋮ A partnership formation game with common preferences and scramble competition ⋮ Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets

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• Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
• Rendezvous Search: A Personal Perspective
• Marriage and Class
• Rendezvous Search on the Line
• The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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