Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0082-5MaRDI QIDQ2482672zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kimmo Eriksson, Jonas Sjöstrand, Pontus Strimling

Publication date 23 April 2008

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0082-5

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriummultiple equilibriaasymmetric equilibriaindependent preferencesmutual mate choicestrategic mating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
• A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
• Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202830 (Why is no real title available?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
• Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
• Optimal selection based on relative rank (the 'Secretary Problem')
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

Cited in

(4)

• Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets
• Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions
• Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets

This page was built for publication: Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2482672)