Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0082-5zbMATH Open1141.91040OpenAlexW2147826828MaRDI QIDQ2482672FDOQ2482672

Authors: Kimmo Eriksson, Jonas Sjöstrand, Pontus Strimling 

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0082-5

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zbMATH Keywords

equilibriummultiple equilibriaasymmetric equilibriaindependent preferencesmutual mate choicestrategic mating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
• Optimal selection based on relative rank (the 'Secretary Problem')
• Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (4)

• Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
• Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets
• Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets

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