Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0082-5MaRDI QIDQ2482672zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kimmo Eriksson, Jonas Sjöstrand, Pontus Strimling

Publication date 23 April 2008

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0082-5

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric equilibriaequilibriumindependent preferencesmultiple equilibriamutual mate choicestrategic mating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Review text

A fundamental fact in two-sided matching is that if a market allows several stable outcomes, then one is optimal for all men in the sense that no man would prefer another stable outcome. A related phenomenon of asymmetric equilibria in a dynamic market is studied where agents enter and search for a mate for at most \(n\) rounds before exiting again. Assuming independent preferences, it is shown that this game has multiple equilibria, some of which are highly asymmetric between sexes. It is further investigated how the set of equilibria depends on a sex difference in the outside option of not being mated at all.

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202830 (Why is no real title available?)
• Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
• Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
• Optimal selection based on relative rank (the 'Secretary Problem')
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

Cited in

(4)

• Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
• Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
• Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions

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