Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets
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Publication:2059069
DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01297-7zbMath1479.91235OpenAlexW3012925425MaRDI QIDQ2059069
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_20-06.pdf
Multisectoral models in economics (91B66) Trade models (91B60) Matching models (91B68) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
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Cites Work
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