Assortative matching with large firms
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Publication:4628429
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(14)- Matching with nonexclusive contracts
- Firm Size, Productivity, and Manager Wages: A Job Assignment Approach
- Inefficient labor market sorting
- Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
- A theory of production, matching, and distribution
- POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS
- Quantile stable mechanisms
- Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets
- Choosing sides in a two-sided matching market
- Identifying sorting-in theory
- Identifying equilibrium models of labor market sorting
- Large firms and within firm occupational reallocation
- Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
- Offshoring, matching, and income inequality
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