Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences (Q2482672)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5266996
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| English | Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5266996 |
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Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences (English)
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23 April 2008
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A fundamental fact in two-sided matching is that if a market allows several stable outcomes, then one is optimal for all men in the sense that no man would prefer another stable outcome. A related phenomenon of asymmetric equilibria in a dynamic market is studied where agents enter and search for a mate for at most \(n\) rounds before exiting again. Assuming independent preferences, it is shown that this game has multiple equilibria, some of which are highly asymmetric between sexes. It is further investigated how the set of equilibria depends on a sex difference in the outside option of not being mated at all.
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mutual mate choice
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strategic mating
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independent preferences
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equilibrium
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multiple equilibria
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asymmetric equilibria
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0.7980179190635681
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0.7817368507385254
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0.7644245028495789
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0.7606550455093384
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0.760438084602356
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