Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3807306 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3807307 (Why is no real title available?)
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Bidding for money
- Competitive-search equilibrium in monetary economies
- Directed search and optimal production
- Directed search with multiple job applications
- Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
- Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
- Implicit Contracts and Employment Theory
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
Cited in
(7)- Directed search and the Bertrand paradox
- Income inequality and endogenous market structure under directed search
- DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH WORKER MOBILITY VIA DIRECTED ON-THE-JOB SEARCH
- Directed search and optimal production
- Contingent Labor Contracting Under Demand and Supply Uncertainty
- Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
- A note on franchising and wage bargaining
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