Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
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Publication:417620
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.014zbMATH Open1258.91121OpenAlexW1990576733MaRDI QIDQ417620FDOQ417620
Authors: Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan 
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2003
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Cites Work
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Directed search and optimal production
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
Cited In (7)
- Directed search and optimal production
- Directed search and the Bertrand paradox
- Contingent Labor Contracting Under Demand and Supply Uncertainty
- Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
- Income inequality and endogenous market structure under directed search
- A note on franchising and wage bargaining
- DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH WORKER MOBILITY VIA DIRECTED ON-THE-JOB SEARCH
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