Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
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Publication:417620
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.014zbMath1258.91121OpenAlexW1990576733MaRDI QIDQ417620
Serene Tan, Nicolas L. Jacquet
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2003
Related Items (4)
Income inequality and endogenous market structure under directed search ⋮ DIRECTED SEARCH AND THE BERTRAND PARADOX ⋮ Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power ⋮ Directed search and optimal production
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