Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0190OpenAlexW3011696315MaRDI QIDQ2099057

Guillem Roig

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0190

zbMATH Keywords

hold-upbilateral investmentlatent contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• Competition in non-linear pricing, market concentration and mergers
• Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
• Common Agency
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Contracting with Externalities
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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