Common Agency
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Publication:3743050
DOI10.2307/1912844zbMath0605.90028OpenAlexW4243073162MaRDI QIDQ3743050
B. Douglas Bernheim, Michael D. Whinston
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912844
existence of equilibriaprincipal-agentinstitutional remedies for welfare lossesrisk-neutral principals
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