Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.004zbMATH Open1196.91035OpenAlexW2079991871MaRDI QIDQ709071FDOQ709071

Authors: Vinicius Carrasco 

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.004

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zbMATH Keywords

regulationcommon agencyrelationship-specific investments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Common Agency
• Renegotiation design with multiple regulators

Cited In (1)

• Sequential investments, know-how transmission, and optimal organization

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