Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00130-3zbMath1042.91057OpenAlexW2022566622MaRDI QIDQ1400986

Michael Peters

Publication date: 17 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00130-3

zbMATH Keywords

contractspure strategy equilibriaBertrand pricing problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (13)

Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity ⋮ Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection ⋮ Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness ⋮ A note on common agency models of moral hazard ⋮ On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations ⋮ On take it or leave it offers in common agency ⋮ Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword ⋮ Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences ⋮ Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games ⋮ Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting ⋮ Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions ⋮ Erratum to ``Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency: [Journal of economic theory 111 (2003) 88--109] ⋮ On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition

Cites Work

• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common Agency
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Unobserved Delegation
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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