A note on common agency models of moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.10.021zbMATH Open1255.91056OpenAlexW201782980MaRDI QIDQ1934052FDOQ1934052

Authors: Andrea Attar, Gwenaël Piaser, Nicolás Porteiro 

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3055/1/attar_piaser_porteiro.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common agencymenus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Common Agency
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions

Cited In (4)

• Participation in moral hazard problems
• A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A MULTIFIRM MORAL-HAZARD ECONOMY WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS
• On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences

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