On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
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Publication:423748
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.01.009zbMATH Open1239.91067OpenAlexW1999281827MaRDI QIDQ423748FDOQ423748
Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.009
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Cites Work
- Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
- Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
- The importance of the agenda in bargaining
- Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
- Contracting with Externalities
- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- The timing of contracting with externalities
- On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
Cited In (7)
- Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure
- On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
- Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
- Leadership ability and agenda choice
- Transparency of outside options in bargaining
- Assembly Problems
- Sequential vote buying
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