On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.01.009MaRDI QIDQ423748zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.009

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powerexploding offersopen-ended offersprivate negotiationspublic negotiations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
• To reveal or not to reveal? Strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation
• Optimal deadlines for agreements
• Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preference

Cites work

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Contracting with Externalities
• Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• The importance of the agenda in bargaining
• The timing of contracting with externalities

Cited in

(9)

• Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure
• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• Assembly problems
• Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
• Fairness and transparency in one-to-many bargaining with complementarity: an experimental study
• Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
• Leadership ability and agenda choice
• Transparency of outside options in bargaining
• Sequential vote buying

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