Sequential contracting with multiple principals
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Publication:1007319
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.003zbMath1159.91009OpenAlexW3121648641MaRDI QIDQ1007319
Giacomo Calzolari, Alessandro Pavan
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.003
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Related Items (7)
Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand ⋮ Slow persuasion ⋮ Reciprocal contracting ⋮ Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ Sequential Bayesian persuasion ⋮ On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations ⋮ On the use of menus in sequential common agency
Cites Work
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
- On the use of menus in sequential common agency
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Dynamic common agency.
- Special Interests and Technological Change
- Oversight of Long-Term Investment by Short-Lived Regulators
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Real Analysis and Probability
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
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