On the use of menus in sequential common agency

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.11.003zbMATH Open1154.91528OpenAlexW2002556438MaRDI QIDQ952782FDOQ952782

Authors: Giacomo Calzolari, A. Pavan 

Publication date: 14 November 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~apa522/MENUS.pdf

Recommendations

• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
• On take it or leave it offers in common agency
• Menu mechanisms
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsequential contractingmenus theorems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals

Cited In (9)

• Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
• On take it or leave it offers in common agency
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Menu contracts and the division of profits in vertical relationships
• Rationality, external norms, and the epistemic value of menus
• Menu mechanisms
• Reciprocal contracting
• Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection

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