Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.013zbMath1132.91541OpenAlexW2088102558MaRDI QIDQ2469861

Seungjin Han

Publication date: 11 February 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.013

zbMATH Keywords

robust equilibriumcompeting-mechanism gamesmultiple principals and multiple agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (11)

Principal-agent VCG contracts ⋮ On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard ⋮ Interactive Information Design ⋮ Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets ⋮ Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness ⋮ Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty ⋮ Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals ⋮ A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency ⋮ Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples ⋮ On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition ⋮ Private communication in competing mechanism games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
• Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• Games Played Through Agents
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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