Private communication in competing mechanism games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.06.002MaRDI QIDQ2324801zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser

Publication date 12 September 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/25757/1/wp_tse_863.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanismsprivate communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals

Cites work

• A commitment folk theorem
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Contractible contracts in common agency problems
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Games Played Through Agents
• Interactive information design
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Nonexclusive competition in the market for lemons
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Reciprocal contracting
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Cited in

(6)

• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
• Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games
• Preemption Games with Private Information
• Should Silence be Heard? Fair Rational Secret Sharing with Silent and Non-silent Players

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