Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents

DOI10.3982/ECTA7005MaRDI QIDQ3564699zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takuro Yamashita

Publication date 26 May 2010

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7005

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremmechanism designrevelation principlecommon agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Private communication in competing mechanism games
• Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Reciprocal contracting
• Games Played Through Agents
• Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
• Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
• Dynamics of three-agent games
• General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment

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