General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102728MaRDI QIDQ2092771zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Seungjin Han

Publication date 3 November 2022

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102728

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanismsmarket informationstrategy-proof punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Game theory
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• Robust competitive auctions
• Robust Mechanism Design

Cited in

(2)

• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Mechanism design with informational punishment

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