Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.10.006MaRDI QIDQ1995461zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Thomas Mariotti, Gwenaël Piaser

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanismsfolk theoremsexclusive competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games
• Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals
• Private communication in competing mechanism games
• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness

Cites work

• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• A commitment folk theorem
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Borel structures for function spaces
• Borel structures for function spaces
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Contractible contracts in common agency problems
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• On general minimax theorems
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Private communication in competing mechanism games
• Program equilibrium
• Reciprocal contracting
• Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Cited in

(11)

• Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
• Private communication in competing mechanism games
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games
• Complements, Not Competitors: Causal and Mathematical Explanations
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals
• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment

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