Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.10.006zbMATH Open1458.91014OpenAlexW3108053261MaRDI QIDQ1995461FDOQ1995461

Thomas Mariotti, Gwenaël Piaser, Eloisa Campioni, Andrea Attar

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanismsfolk theoremsexclusive competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Program equilibrium
• On general minimax theorems
• A commitment folk theorem
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Borel structures for function spaces
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• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
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• Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence
• Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
• Reciprocal contracting
• Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
• Private communication in competing mechanism games

Cited In (7)

• Private communication in competing mechanism games
• Complements, Not Competitors: Causal and Mathematical Explanations
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment

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