Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
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Publication:1995461
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.10.006zbMATH Open1458.91014OpenAlexW3108053261MaRDI QIDQ1995461FDOQ1995461
Authors: Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Thomas Mariotti, Gwenaël Piaser 
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006
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Cites Work
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Cited In (11)
- Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
- Private communication in competing mechanism games
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- Complements, Not Competitors: Causal and Mathematical Explanations
- Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games
- Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
- Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals
- Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
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