Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.004zbMath1400.91207MaRDI QIDQ503042

I. Arribas, Amparo Urbano

Publication date: 11 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2014/0614.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibrium; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; delegated agency games; mixed bundling prices; multiproduct price competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity

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