Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers

DOI10.1007/BF01213445zbMath0872.90123MaRDI QIDQ2365070

Shlomo Weber, Michel Le Breton, Hideo Konishi

Publication date: 26 October 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

spilloversstrong Nash equilibriacoalition-proof Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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