Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
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Cited in
(5)- Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
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- Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
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