Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0218-XMaRDI QIDQ1762845zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murat R. Sertel, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 11 February 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0218-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• Social Indeterminacy
• Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

Cited in

(16)

• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
• Let them cheat!
• On the rule of \(k\) names
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Generalized Condorcet winners
• Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting
• The basic approval voting game
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Balancing the power to appoint officers

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