Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0218-XMaRDI QIDQ1762845zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murat R. Sertel, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 11 February 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0218-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• Social Indeterminacy
• Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

Cited in

(16)

• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
• Let them cheat!
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
• On the rule of \(k\) names
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting
• Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• The basic approval voting game
• Balancing the power to appoint officers
• Generalized Condorcet winners
• When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality

This page was built for publication: Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1762845)