Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0218-XzbMATH Open1090.91023OpenAlexW1997123971MaRDI QIDQ1762845FDOQ1762845

Authors: Murat R. Sertel, M. Remzi Sanver 

Publication date: 11 February 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0218-x

Recommendations

• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• Social Indeterminacy
• Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (16)

• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
• Let them cheat!
• On the rule of \(k\) names
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting
• The basic approval voting game
• Generalized Condorcet winners
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Balancing the power to appoint officers

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