Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
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Publication:1762845
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0218-xzbMath1090.91023MaRDI QIDQ1762845
Murat R. Sertel, M. Remzi Sanver
Publication date: 11 February 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0218-x
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