Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
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Cites work
Cited in
(15)- On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
- Effect of thermal stresses and reduced differential transform on bending of the rectangular plate
- The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
- When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Condorcet efficiency, information costs, and the performance of scoring rules
- Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
- Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
- Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
- The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
- Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates
- Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
- Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules
- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
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