Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0789zbMath0991.91023OpenAlexW1979292479MaRDI QIDQ5928236

Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 3 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/302529181e9d906583708d29489b75f676f11134

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional strategy proofnessnonbossiness in terms of welfareserial-dictatorshipsingle-dipped preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items

Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped, Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped, Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible, Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences, Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?, On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences, Single-basined choice, Non-bossiness, Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences, Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

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