Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object (Q5928236)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1582219
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| English | Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1582219 |
Statements
Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object (English)
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3 September 2002
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Two allocation models are studied. The first model concerns the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second one the author considers the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Four decision rules are discussed: Pareto optimal, strategy-proofness, coalitional strategy-proofness and weak-bossines (in terms of welfare). A decision mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent ever can gain by misrepresenting his preferences, irrespective of the preferences announced by the other agents. A strengthening of strategy-proofness is the coalitional strategy-proofness: no group or coalition of agents can ever benefit from misrepresenting their preferences.
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single-dipped preferences
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coalitional strategy proofness
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nonbossiness in terms of welfare
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serial-dictatorship
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0.8552286624908447
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0.8524777293205261
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0.8402996063232422
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0.836382269859314
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0.8291411399841309
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