Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01427-1zbMath1520.91207OpenAlexW3176485737MaRDI QIDQ6168816

Hirofumi Yamamura, Fumiya Inoue

Publication date: 11 July 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01427-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible

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