Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
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Publication:6168816
DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01427-1zbMath1520.91207OpenAlexW3176485737MaRDI QIDQ6168816
Hirofumi Yamamura, Fumiya Inoue
Publication date: 11 July 2023
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01427-1
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (2)
Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
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