On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2867517
DOI10.1515/bejte-2012-0028zbMath1278.91052OpenAlexW2108996386WikidataQ109039359 ScholiaQ109039359MaRDI QIDQ2867517
Ahmed Doghmi, Abderrahmane Ziad
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0028
single-dipped preferencessingle-peaked preferencesNash implementationpartial honestysingle-plateaued preferences
Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items
On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
Cites Work
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
