Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
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Recommendations
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Cites work
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Self-selective social choice functions
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
Cited in
(20)- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
- Honesty in discrete, nonlocal and randomly position structured fragmentation model with unbounded rates
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
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