Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
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Publication:2013373
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.05.014zbMATH Open1393.91058OpenAlexW2687333023WikidataQ109043325 ScholiaQ109043325MaRDI QIDQ2013373FDOQ2013373
Eve Ramaekers, Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://alfresco-guest.uclouvain.be/share/proxy/alfresco/slingshot/node/content/workspace/SpacesStore/4ce9dc39-684d-4df9-a492-1de6eeae7c1d/coredp2017_11web.pdf
Cites Work
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
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- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Self-selective social choice functions
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
Cited In (16)
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Honesty in discrete, nonlocal and randomly position structured fragmentation model with unbounded rates
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
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