Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.05.014MaRDI QIDQ2013373zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://alfresco-guest.uclouvain.be/share/proxy/alfresco/slingshot/node/content/workspace/SpacesStore/4ce9dc39-684d-4df9-a492-1de6eeae7c1d/coredp2017_11web.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

partial honestyimplementation in undominated strategiesPareto correspondencebounded mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

Cites work

• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
• On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Self-selective social choice functions
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
• Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

Cited in

(19)

• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
• Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Motives and implementation with rights structures
• Honesty in discrete, nonlocal and randomly position structured fragmentation model with unbounded rates
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
• A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
• Double implementation without no-veto-power
• Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals

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