Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
This paper studies procedures for collective decision making that ensure that collective decisions are Pareto-efficient provided that all agents choose strategies that are not weakly dominated. We first show that such procedures always exist. We then introduce the notion of a ``compromise, and investigate whether, within the considered class of procedures, there are procedures which do not exclude compromises. We show, using some additional assumptions, that the answer is positive. Finally, we ask whether within the considered class of procedures there are procedures which automatically guide agents to compromises. We show, again using some additional assumptions, that the answer to this question is negative.
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- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795158 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Compromising as an equal loss principle
- The robustness of robust implementation
- Note on compromise axiom
- Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods
- Bargaining through approval
- Unanimity games and Pareto optimality
- Efficient compromising
- Normal forms and unfoldings of singular strategy functions
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