Recommendations
Cites work
- A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
- Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Communication, computability, and common interest games
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Dynamic coordination games
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1396804 (Why is no real title available?)
- Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
- Joint Projects without Commitment
- Monotone games with positive spillovers
- Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem
- Sequential moves and tacit collusion: Reaction-function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Cited in
(8)- The emergence of cooperation through leadership
- Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
- Inefficiency in alternately repeated games with overlapping generations
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
- Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 980425 (Why is no real title available?)
- Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
- Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
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