Coordination need not be a problem
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Publication:2276550
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.002zbMath1280.91008OpenAlexW2090357339MaRDI QIDQ2276550
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.002
Related Items (5)
Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality ⋮ Inefficiency in alternately repeated games with overlapping generations ⋮ Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
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