Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.004zbMath1369.91008OpenAlexW2295660698MaRDI QIDQ281391

Rohan Dutta, Ryosuke Ishii

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

deterrencecoordination gamesdynamic commitmentendogenous timingpayoff dominancestag hunt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items

Sequential commitment games

Cites Work

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