Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria

DOI10.1142/9789811202018_0011MaRDI QIDQ3299265zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas A. Weber

Publication date 22 July 2020

Published in Game Theoretic Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811202018_0011

zbMATH Keywords

first-mover advantagesubgame perfectionsecond-mover advantagepartial commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Dynamic games (91A25) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cited in

(3)

• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
• Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

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