Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria

DOI10.1142/S0219198919400115MaRDI QIDQ4968310zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas A. Weber

Publication date 12 July 2019

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919400115

zbMATH Keywords

first-mover advantagepartial commitmentsecond-mover advantagesubgame perfection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cites work

• A continuum of commitment
• A course in game theory.
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
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• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3144124 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18246 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910826 (Why is no real title available?)
• Microeconomic theory
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(2)

• Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

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