Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
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The authors define for a game \(G\) and a natural number \(m\) the unilateral commitment game \(U(G^m)\) which consists of a) a move in which both players simultaneously and independently choose a subset of their strategy set (this is called the unilateral commitment), and (b) \(m\) moves of the original game \(G\) restricted to the sets of strategies chosen in step (a). NEWLINENEWLINENEWLINEThen they prove that for each game \(G\) that satisfies certain conditions there is a number \(m\) such that \(U(G^m)\) has a Nash equilibrium.
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Cites work
Cited in
(7)- Commitment games
- Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
- The role of commitment in repeated games
- Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
- Delegation and strategic altruism: a theoretical approach
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