Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games

DOI10.1142/S0219198900000147MaRDI QIDQ2701829zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luciano Méndez-Naya, Fioravante Patrone, Ignacio García-Jurado

Publication date 30 January 2002

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000147

zbMATH Keywords

finitely repeated gamesNash equilibriumunilateral commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• The absent-minded driver
• Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Cited in

(7)

• Commitment games
• Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
• The role of commitment in repeated games
• Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
• Delegation and strategic altruism: a theoretical approach
• Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games

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