Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games
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Cites work
- An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207367 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784577 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
Cited in
(6)- On the foundation of stability
- Infinite histories and steady orbits in repeated games
- Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets
- Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
- Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
- Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
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