Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games
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Publication:1867807
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00089-0zbMath1023.91005MaRDI QIDQ1867807
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
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