Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games

DOI10.3982/TE1893MaRDI QIDQ4586070zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1893

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentrepeated gamesreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(14)

• The role of commitment in repeated games
• Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Reputation for playing mixed actions: a characterization theorem
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Reputation games for undirected graphs
• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
• Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Ransomware and reputation

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