Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting

DOI10.2307/2171775MaRDI QIDQ4859518zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin W. Cripps, J. P. Thomas

Publication date 7 January 1996

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/16389/1/16389.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremincomplete informationno discountingreputationtwo-person repeated gamestwo-sided uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

Cited in

(11)

• Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
• Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation

This page was built for publication: Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4859518)