Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.012MaRDI QIDQ894041zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci

Publication date 23 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.012

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesreputationimperfect monitoringfinite automatonlong-run playersequal discount factor

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1095138 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Advanced mathematical economics.
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
• Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Reputation in long-run relationships
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Simple bounds on the value of a reputation
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Cited in

(20)

• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games
• The Fragmentation of Reputation
• A reputation for honesty
• Reputation in long-run relationships
• Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
• Reputation for playing mixed actions: a characterization theorem
• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620856 (Why is no real title available?)
• Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• A note on reputation: more on the chain-store paradox
• Selloffs, bailouts, and feedback: can asset markets inform policy?
• Order of limits in reputations
• Reputation effects under interdependent values
• Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)

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