Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
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Publication:2345217
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.002zbMath1311.91030OpenAlexW2067389278MaRDI QIDQ2345217
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.002
Related Items (2)
Reputation compensation for incentive alignment in a supply chain with trade credit under information asymmetry ⋮ Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns
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