Bounded memory and permanent reputations
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Publication:392656
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.06.006zbMath1294.91026MaRDI QIDQ392656
Publication date: 15 January 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.06.006
Related Items
Bad reputation with simple rating systems, Learning with bounded memory in games, Bounded memory and incomplete information, Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
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