Sustainable reputations with rating systems
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Publication:533088
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.02.015zbMath1282.91125OpenAlexW2171257445MaRDI QIDQ533088
Publication date: 2 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59682
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (13)
Order of limits in reputations ⋮ Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ Limited records and reputation bubbles ⋮ Bad reputation with simple rating systems ⋮ Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game ⋮ Variable temptations and black mark reputations ⋮ Restricted feedback in long term relationships ⋮ Impermanent types and permanent reputations ⋮ Bounded memory and incomplete information ⋮ Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games ⋮ Market screening with limited records ⋮ The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
Cites Work
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Seller Reputation
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Who Wants a Good Reputation?
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