Order of limits in reputations
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Publication:333475
DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9539-YzbMATH Open1378.91024OpenAlexW2278121156MaRDI QIDQ333475FDOQ333475
Authors: Nuh Aygün Dalkıran 
Publication date: 31 October 2016
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/36899
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Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Game theory
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
- Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Reputation in long-run relationships
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
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