Recommendations
Cites work
- A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Game theory
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation in long-run relationships
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
- Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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