Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
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Publication:1321542
DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1006zbMath0804.90149OpenAlexW3123995444MaRDI QIDQ1321542
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
Publication date: 28 April 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203774
General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-08)
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