Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.006MaRDI QIDQ2397637zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuk-fai Fong, Jin Li

Publication date 23 May 2017

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency wageslimited liabilityrelational contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
• Nonstationary relational contracts with adverse selection
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
• Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations

Cites work

• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
• Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
• Impatience versus incentives
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Nonstationary relational contracts with adverse selection
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Optimal contracts with shirking
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• The political economy of indirect control
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(17)

• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
• Costly rewards and punishments
• Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations
• On the existence of share contracts under limited liability
• The relational underpinnings of formal contracting and the welfare consequences of legal system improvement
• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
• Partnership in a dynamic production system with unobservable actions and noncontractible output
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Relationships and growth: on the dynamic interplay between relational contracts and competitive markets in economic development
• Nonstationary relational contracts with adverse selection
• Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship
• Termination as an incentive device
• Relational contracts: public versus private savings
• Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital
• Repeated delegation

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