Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
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Publication:2397637
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.006zbMATH Open1400.91279OpenAlexW2339212378MaRDI QIDQ2397637FDOQ2397637
Authors: Yuk-fai Fong, Jin Li 
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.006
Recommendations
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- Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations
Cites Work
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
- Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
- Optimal Contracts with Shirking
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
- The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
- A Theory of Wage Dynamics
- Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
- The Political Economy of Indirect Control *
- Impatience versus Incentives
- NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*
Cited In (10)
- Costly rewards and punishments
- Partnership in a dynamic production system with unobservable actions and noncontractible output
- Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
- Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
- Repeated delegation
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
- Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- Termination as an incentive device
- Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship
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