Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2397637
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.006zbMath1400.91279OpenAlexW2339212378MaRDI QIDQ2397637
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.006
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (6)
Termination as an incentive device ⋮ Dynamic relational contracts under complete information ⋮ Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations ⋮ Ambiguity in dynamic contracts ⋮ Repeated delegation ⋮ Costly rewards and punishments
Cites Work
- Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- A Theory of Wage Dynamics
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
- Impatience versus Incentives
- NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
- Optimal Contracts with Shirking
- The Political Economy of Indirect Control *
- Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
- The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
This page was built for publication: Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
