Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.006zbMATH Open1400.91279OpenAlexW2339212378MaRDI QIDQ2397637FDOQ2397637

Yuk-fai Fong, Jin Li

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

relational contractslimited liabilityefficiency wages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
• Optimal Contracts with Shirking
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• The Political Economy of Indirect Control *
• Impatience versus Incentives
• NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*

Cited In (7)

• Costly rewards and punishments
• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
• Repeated delegation
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
• Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations
• Termination as an incentive device

This page was built for publication: Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2397637)