Ambiguity in dynamic contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105229zbMATH Open1481.91103OpenAlexW3134177966MaRDI QIDQ2067409FDOQ2067409

Authors: Martin Szydlowski, Ji Hee Yoon 

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1543.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

ambiguityovercompensationcontinuous timeprincipal-agent model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cited In (12)

• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and the incentive problem with interim participation constraints
• Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation
• Flexible contracts
• Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting
• Research on investment incorporating both environmental performance and long (short) term financial performance of firms
• Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
• Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
• Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
• Robust contracting and corporate-termism

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