Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown

DOI10.3982/TE1439MaRDI QIDQ4585994zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julien Prat, Boyan Jovanovic

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1439

zbMATH Keywords

learningreputationprivate informationoptimal contractprincipal-agent modelcareer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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(18)

• Moral hazard under ambiguity
• Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal
• Information and experimentation in short-term contracting
• Experimentation in organizations
• The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability
• Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
• Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management
• Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
• New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting
• Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
• Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
• A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
• The curse of long horizons
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Optimal contracts for experimentation

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