Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
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Publication:4585994
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Cited in
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- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
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- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
- Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management
- Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
- Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
- Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
- The curse of long horizons
- Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
- The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Optimal contracts for experimentation
- Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal
- Information and experimentation in short-term contracting
- Experimentation in organizations
- Dynamic incentive contracts with controllable risk
- A note on persistent private information
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