Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal

DOI10.3906/mat-1703-102zbMath1424.91078arXiv1806.01495OpenAlexW2963813677MaRDI QIDQ4634215

Kerem Uğurlu

Publication date: 7 May 2019

Published in: TURKISH JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.01495

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlmoral hazarddynamic principal-agent problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (5)

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