Corporate insurance and managerial incentives

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2260zbMath0887.90047OpenAlexW2079002734MaRDI QIDQ1367894

Jaeyoung Sung

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2260

zbMATH Keywords

agency modelcooperate insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (9)

Dynamic Contracting: Accidents Lead to Nonlinear Contracts ⋮ Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks ⋮ Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems ⋮ Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation ⋮ Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents ⋮ Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal ⋮ Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions ⋮ OPTIMAL MULTI-AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS ⋮ Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences

Cites Work

• Point processes and queues. Martingale dynamics
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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