Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions

DOI10.1007/s11579-007-0002-2zbMath1173.91383OpenAlexW2162537913MaRDI QIDQ2459035

Jakša Cvitanić, Jianfeng Zhang

Publication date: 5 November 2007

Published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-007-0002-2

zbMATH Keywords

Moral hazardContractsAdverse selectionContinuous-time modelsManagers compensationPrincipal-agent problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (11)

Moral hazard under ambiguity ⋮ A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring ⋮ Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard ⋮ Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation ⋮ Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty ⋮ A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure ⋮ Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats ⋮ Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection ⋮ Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection ⋮ Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences

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